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This thesis examines the processes used by the Navy 
and the Air Force for identifying incremental costs 
associated with the aircraft platforms used in support of 
the Noble Anvil campaign, which highlighted the bombing of 
Kosovo.  Examination of these methods was done to determine 
if the Navy was able to properly and completely capture 
incremental costs to receive full reimbursement from the 
Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF).  The 
thesis begins with an overview of the OCOTF and its 
intended purpose, and continues with an in depth analysis 
of the processes implemented by both services to identify 
and report incremental costs for aircraft platforms to OSD.  
It further compares the methodologies, highlighting the 
advantages and pitfalls of each, and assesses the 
possibility of lost funding to the Navy based on the 
processes employed. 
This research concludes that the Navy did not suffer 
any loss of funds based on inequity in disbursements from 
the OCOTF based on the methodologies it exercised.  
However, key factors which potentially prevented greater 
reimbursement were identified to be:  1) The interpretation 
of vague guidance for determining incremental costs, 2) 
Poor record-keeping and accountability of operational 
missions flown, 3) The use of different methodologies for 
capturing incremental costs by both services and within the 
Navy, and 4) The impact of the Navy’s forward deployed 
status on incremental costs. 
  v
Recommendations are made for improvements which the 
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This thesis analyzes the documented incremental costs 
for the Departments of the Navy and Air Force for Operation 
Allied Force/Noble Anvil, which highlighted the Kosovo 
bombing campaign during the period March through June 1999.   
Analysis of these costs show that despite an apparent 
imbalance of reimbursements from the Overseas Contingency 
Operations Transfer Fund (to be referred to as OCOTF or the 
Fund), the Navy did receive its fair share from the Fund 
based on the cost data it submitted.  OCOTF reimbursements 
showed the Air Force as receiving 84% of the disbursements, 
with the remainder being distributed to the Navy.  The key 
factor in this disparity was the difference in 
methodologies used within the Navy and by the Air Force.  
The two services applied different cost per flying hour 
estimates in their billing processes.  The method used by 
the Air Force, combined with the number of missions flown 
generated higher incremental costs, and therefore greater 
reimbursement from the Fund.  Other factors contributing to 
the difference in disbursement include the forward deployed 
status of the Navy which limited its entitlement to 
additional costs; and infrastructure claims made by the Air 
Force which were not applicable to the Navy. 
 
B. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
  1
An in-depth review of documented reports and current 
regulations provided the backdrop which illustrates why 
problems with identifying incremental costs for 
contingencies is difficult, not only for the Navy, but for 
all services.  While the 2001 version of the Department of 
Defense Financial Management Regulation (DoDFMR) now 
provides a comprehensive outline of what is required of the 
services, research into the evolution of the chapter 
addressing contingency operations shows that such clarity 
was not prevalent in the preceding 1995 version.  The 
DoDFMR is the primary document relied upon by the services 
to outline key parameters sought by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and Congress for verification of 
claimed reimburseable costs.  It was found that critical 
information was not available in the initial 1995 version, 
and military leaders responsible for ensuring the 
correctness of the claims, were left to their own 
interpretation of what should be considered reimburseable 
until clarification was provided in the updated 2001 
chapter. 
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Comparative reviews of the procedures employed by the 
services, prior to receipt of the new guidance, revealed 
that there was clearly no uniformity or clarity of what 
methodology would be most beneficial.  The lack of guidance 
and the responsibility being placed on the services to 
implement their own systems of identifying costs resulted 
in each service utilizing starkly different systems.  
Research shows that during this period, the Air Force’s 
approach to identifying incremental costs was the most 
successful for gaining increased reimbursements from the 
OCOTF, while the Navy remained more conservative, and 
received less.  Contrasting the former systems used to the 
ones currently mandated reflect the impact of the changes 
that have taken place over the past decade. 
A wealth of studies conducted by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) provided the most comprehensive 
information available on DOD contingency operations, and 
the incremental costs incurred as a result of supporting 
them.  Key information was drawn from GAO Report NSIAD-00-
168, “Fiscal Year 2000 Contingency Operations Costs and 
Funding; and GAO Report NSAID-00-100R, “Fiscal Years 1999 
and 2000 Contingency Operations Cost and Funding [Refs 5 
and 7].  The concerns of Congress regarding the variations 
in claims for reimburseable costs from the OCOTF resulted 
in numerous requests for definitive data on why such a 
problem existed throughout the Department of Defense; which 
resulted in GAO expending many hours in the investigation 
and collection of this information. 
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Direct contact with persons possessing corporate 
knowledge on incremental costing determination systems, 
both current and pre-OCOTF days, was invaluable.  While it 
was not possible to interact with military members who were 
instrumental in compiling cost data during the period in 
question, contact with civilian employees (specifically at 
the NAVCOMPT and SAF/FMB (Air Force) levels) provided great 
overviews of the bigger picture.  While the quest to find 
persons associated with the detailed methodology of 
capturing costs at the unit level during FY99 was not 
achieved, conversations with individuals at higher levels 
within the chain assisted the researcher in understanding 
the numerous variables which contribute to the problems 
associated with accurately capturing incremental costs.   
Interviews with the analysts who compile and cost 
incremental data for the Navy and the Air Force, under the 
current system, provided insight to the methodologies that 
may have been applied in past practices.  Also, access to 
the historical files, yielded data which had been submitted 
for past campaigns.  Even though the records did not 
expressly identify what factors were used in the 
compilation process, it was possible to compare the various 
types and numbers of aircraft assets which contributed to 
each.  This aided in assessing what type of costs were 
considered to be valid incremental costs.   
Finally, reviews of budgetary data revealed the 
differences in how contingencies were funded before and 
after the implementation of the OCOTF.  The past ten years 
of historical data demonstrate the evolution of the process 
from each service, in effect, being penalized with reduced 
training dollars if cost overruns were not reimbursed by 
supplemental funding or reprogrammings, to the 
establishment of the OCOTF which was designed to regulate 
the steady stream of alternative funding actions.  
The continuing sections in this chapter will provide 
an overview of the contingency and the support requirements 
of both services. 
 
C. NOBLE ANVIL  
  4
 In the early 1990’s Kosovo became the new world 
hotspot, with ethnic Albanians and Serbian refugees feuding 
over which group deserved to inhabit the area.  Several 
years of what came to be known as “ethnic cleansing” 
captured the attention of the world stage.  There ensued 
international demands for peace in the area.  Refusal by 
Yugoslav leaders to meet peace initiatives, as dictated by 
NATO, led to an allied bombing campaign over the area.  The 
NATO response to the Kosovo conflict was entitled Operation 
Allied Force, with the U. S. Naval force component referred 
to by mission title Noble Anvil.  
 
D. NAVAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 
Naval forces tasked to participate in the campaign 
included the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier battle group 
which was comprised of the aircraft carrier, USS Theodore 
Roosevelt; cruisers USS Vella Gulf and USS Leyte Gulf; 
destroyers USS Gonzales, USS Ross and USS Peterson; 
submarines USS Albuquerque and USS Boise; and the Kearsarge 
Amphibious Ready Group which consisted of the USS 
Kearsarge, USS Ponce and the USS Gunston Hall [Ref 15]. 
Upon commencement of the bombing campaign, the USS 
Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) and its attached air wing (CVW-
8) were pre-positioned in the Mediterranean theater for 
regularly scheduled deployment and operations.  The USS 
Enterprise (CVN 65) did not participate in the campaign, 
but contributed aircraft support from its air wing (CVW-3).  
Additionally, specialized support aircraft were contributed 
by Commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific (CNAP), in the form 
of EA6Bs and P3Cs.  Shown below are the aircraft 
contributed by CNAP (Table 1), and CNAL (Table 2), 
delineated by type-model-series (TMS).  The hours flown in 






TMS APR MAY JUN JUL 
EA-6B 1735  1639 420 0 
P-3C 56 192 235 0 
Total 1791 1831 655 0 
 
Table 1.   Hours Flown in Support of Noble 
             Anvil by Naval Air Forces, Pacific 
 
   
March           
CVW-3   Budgeted Actual Incremental
CVN-65  T/M/S Hours Hours Hours 
        
VF -32  F-14B 149.7 190.8 41.1 
VFA-37  FA-18C 210.8 259.1 48.3 
VFA-105  FA-18C 210.8 238.2 27.4 
VAW-126  E-2C 96.5 103.6 7.1 
VS-22  S-3B 174.8 219.1 44.3 
HS-7  SH-60F 98.6 101.2 2.6 
HS-7  HH-60H 73.9 66.6 0 
VQ-6   ES-3A 96.5 150 53.5 
      
April           
CVW-3   Budgeted Actual Incremental 
CVN-65  T/M/S Hours Hours Hours 
        
VF -32  F-14B 149.7 80.7 0.0 
VFA-37  FA-18C 228.4 115.3 0.0 
VFA-105  FA-18C 210.8 93.2 0.0 
VAW-126  E-2C 96.5 23.2 0.0 
VS-22  S-3B 174.8 76.9 0.0 
HS-7  SH-60F 98.6 39.2 0.0 
HS-7  HH-60H 73.9 36.9 0.0 
VQ-6  ES-3A 96.5 47.9 0.0 
        
CVW-8       
CVN-71       
        
VF-14  F-14A 329.4 593.3 263.9 
VF-41  F-14A 329.4 634.5 305.1 
VFA-15  FA-18C 421.7 684.9 263.2 
VFA-87  FA-18C 421.7 742.3 320.6 
VAW-124  E-2C 193.1 309.3 116.2 
VS-24  S-3B 349.7 728.1 378.4 
HS-3  SH-60F 197.2 282.6 85.4 
HS-3   HH-60H 147.9 159.6 11.7 
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May           
CVW-8   Budgeted Actual Incremental
CVN-71  T/M/S Hours Hours Hours 
        
VF-14  F-14A 329.4 770.8 441.4 
VF-41  F-14A 329.4 718.0 388.6 
VFA-15  FA-18C 421.7 823.2 401.5 
VFA-87  FA-18C 421.7 840.1 418.4 
VAW-124  E-2C 193.1 330.2 137.1 
VS-24  S-3B 349.7 782.2 432.5 
HS-3  SH-60F 197.2 278.6 81.4 
HS-3  HH-60H 147.9 182.0 34.1 
VQ-6  ES-3A 193.1 91.8 0 
HSL SQD   SH-60B 223.2 309.1 85.9 
 
June           
CVW-8   Budgeted Actual Incremental
CVN-71  T/M/S Hours Hours Hours 
        
VF-14  F-14A 329.4 659 329.6 
VF-41  F-14A 329.4 663.6 334.2 
VFA-15  FA-18C 421.7 644.1 222.4 
VFA-87  FA-18C 421.7 659.2 237.5 
VAW-124  E-2C 193.1 304 110.9 
VS-24  S-3B 349.7 714 364.3 
HS-3  SH-60F 197.2 160 0 
HS-3  HH-60H 147.9 219.3 71.4 
VQ-6   ES-3A 193.1 70.7 0 
 
Table 2.   Hours Flown in Support of Noble  
                   Anvil by Naval Air Force, Atlantic 
 
 
E. AIR FORCE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 
In contrast to the Navy’s forward deployed assets, the 
Air Force provided aircraft from various bases stateside 
and overseas.  Table 3 shows that aircraft were sent to the 
European theater from the Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, 
VA; Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, IL; Air Education and 
Training Command, Randolph AFB, TX; as well U.S. Air Forces 
Europe (USAFE), Ramstein AB, Germany.  The use of each 
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command’s respective National Guard and/or reserve 
squadrons is also noted.   
 
ACC FLOWN FLOWN FLOWN FLOWN FY 99 FY99
 CMD 1QTR 2QTR 3QTR 4QTR TOTAL TOTAL
ACC ACTIVE MSN PEC CONTRIB INCREM INCREM INCREM INCREM INCREM* REQM'T
 
B52 OAF 11113 369 0 271 1,392 0 1,663 2,032
B1B OAF 11126 71 0 49 714 0 763 834
B2A OAF 11127 0 0 311 1,100 0 1,411 1,411
A10A OAF 27130 258 0 0 558 0 558 816
F16C OAF 27133 1822 0 0 4,111 0 4,111 5,933
F117A OAF 27241 758 0 309 1,956 0 2,265 3,023
OA10A OAF 27418 30 0 0 66 0 66 96
KC135R OAF 27223 371 0 0 990 0 990 1,361
HH60G OAF 27224 114 0 0 154 0 154 268
RC135V/W OAF 35207 386 0 284 1,038 0 1,322 1,708
RC135U OAF 35207 0 0 0 47 0 47 47
E8C OAF 27581 343 0 253 770 0 1,023 1,366
EC130H OAF 27253 679 0 168 1,460 0 1,628 2,307
EC130E OAF 27419 329 0 0 0 0 0 329
B2A OAF 11127 311 0 0 0 0 0 311
E3B OAF 27417 612 0 0 1,073 0 1,073 1,685
TOTAL OAF 6453 0 1645 15429 0 17074 23527  
 
RESERVE MSN PEC CONTRIB INCREM INCREM INCREM INCREM INCREM* REQM'T
HH60G OAF 27224 0 0 0 21 0 21 21
HC130P OAF 27224 0 0 0 73 0 73 73 
 
ANG OAF 27419 0 0 45 475 0 520 520 
 
USAFE
FLOWN FLOWN FLOWN FLOWN FY 99 FY99
 CMD 1QTR 2QTR 3QTR 4QTR TOTAL TOTAL
AFE ACTIVE MSN PEC CONTRIB INCREM INCREM INCREM INCREM INCREM REQM'T
A10A OAF 27131 902 0 497 3,314 0 3,811 4,713
F15C OAF 27130 795 0 796 4,705 0 5,501 6,296
F15E OAF 27134 318 0 583 3,720 0 4,303 4,621
F16C OAF 27133 2,086 0 2,299 14,172 0 16,471 18,557
KC135R OAF 27223 415 0 464 2,410 0 2,874 3,289 
 
ANG
A10A OAF 27131 0 0 0 829 0 829 829




FLOWN FLOWN FLOWN FLOWN FY 99 FY99
 CMD 1QTR 2QTR 3QTR 4QTR TOTAL TOTAL
AMC ACTIVE MSN PEC CONTRIB INCREM INCREM INCREM INCREM INCREM REQM'T
KC135R OAF 41218 3,139 0 674 13,666 0 14,340 17,479
KC135T OAF 41218 383 0 37 6,198 0 6,235 6,618
KC10A OAF 41219 2,965 0 283 7,054 0 7,337 10,302 
 
RESERVE
KC10A OAF 41219 0 0 0 14 0 14 14
KC135R OAF 41219 0 0 35 1641 0 1676 1676 
 
ANG
KC135R OAF 41218 0 0 613 3533 0 4,146 4,146
KC135T OAF 41218 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
AETC
FLOWN FLOWN FLOWN FLOWN FY 99 FY99
 CMD 1QTR 2QTR 3QTR 4QTR TOTAL TOTAL
AETC ACTIVE MSN PEC CONTRIB INCREM INCREM INCREM INCREM INCREM REQM'T
KC135R OAF 41897 0 0 437 0 437 437 
 
Table 3.   Hours Flown in Support of Noble  
                   Anvil by the Air Force 
 
 
The following chapters will address the reason for the 
implementation of the OCOTF, and its purpose.  It will be 
shown how incremental costs were identified and computed by 
the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), and 
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), as well as 
the Air Force.  Comparative analysis of these systems will 
reveal the causes of the disparities in incremental costing 
by the services, which would later claim the attention of 
Congress.  Conclusions discuss why the Navy’s portion of 
the reimbursement from the OCOTF is considered to be fair.  
Finally, recommendations for improving this position are 
offered.  Specific areas of improvement include the need 
  9
for the Navy to establish a viable system for identifying 
and capturing incremental costs, which can aid senior 
leaders in justifying claims of increased costs for 
contingencies to OSD.   
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
TRANSFER FUND 
A. ESTABLISHMENT AND PURPOSE 
The Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund 
was established in FY 1997 by DOD Appropriations 
Act, PL104-208, to meet operational requirements 
in support of contingency operations without 
disrupting approved program execution or force 
readiness [Ref 1, p73].   
The OCOTF for payment of military pay, allowances and 
support; operations and maintenance of forces; procurement 
and equipment and RDT&E associated with contingency 
operations.  The implementation of such a fund was 
necessary due to the increasing number of contingencies 
worldwide supported by U. S. military forces.  In the past, 
each service generated their annual budget based on 
projected mission and training requirements to attain a 
level of combat preparedness, however contingencies were 
not considered in the budget estimate.  Known training 
requirements were, and still are, generally funded at a 
rate less than one hundred percent.  Before establishment 
of the Fund, additional costs for supporting unforeseen 
contingencies were initially funded through funds budgeted 
for training, and the services later recouped monies 
through reprogrammings, and/or supplemental appropriations 
which funneled funds back to their respective Operations 
and Maintenance and Military Personnel accounts.  Any 
shortfalls in the reimbursements were absorbed within the 
service’s current budget appropriations. 
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For years, Congress wrestled with the problem of 
paying for unforeseen conflicts from existing military 
budgets, realizing the impact suffered through decreased 
training and mission readiness.  Although supplemental 
legislation could relieve the situation, it was subject to 
discretionary spending limits imposed by the Budget 
Enforcement Act.  The only way to circumvent the spending 
limit under this Act was to designate funding as 
“emergency”, which was done frequently.   
Congressional concerns over the best way to resolve 
this on-going dilemma led to numerous investigations by the 
General Accounting Office (GAO), yielding recommendations 
to either amend the existing mechanisms for funding 
contingency operations, or create new ones [Ref 3, 
Summary].  Thus, the Fund was born.       
It would soon be realized that in spite of the newly 
installed funding mechanism, continuing contingencies were 
being budgeted for within the Fund at a rate much less than 
what was necessary to carry out mission objectives, as 
outlined in the following section on funding.  Also, a lack 
of reserve funding for unforeseen conflicts further 
complicated the issue.   
 
B. OPERATION OF THE FUND  
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The OCOTF is funded by annual Congressional 
appropriation, which is based on contingency estimates 
presented by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and 
incorporated in the President’s budget.  The responsibility 
for managing the Fund, screening reimbursement requests and 
authorizing disbursements from it, rests with SECDEF.   
The estimates used to keep the Fund operating are 
generated by the military services and defense agencies 
which attempt to predict how much on-going and projected 
conflicts will cost by considering factors such as required 
operations, expected duration, logistical support, 
environmental factors, force size, and special pay of 
participating troops.   
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Despite the Fund receiving budgeted dollars by 
Congressional appropriation, it has invariably been 
replenished throughout the year by a continuous stream of 
reprogramming actions and emergency supplementals as 
operations increase, and claims begin to exceed the 
earmarked minimums.  For the Noble Anvil bombing campaign 
alone, the Fund received an injection of an additional 
$5.78 billion through these channels [Ref 6, p27].  This 
process has been consistent for all campaigns since its 
inception.  While our military leaders are adept at 
assessing the probable impact of the noted factors on the 
budget, they cannot foresee the future.  This is the 
primary reason for the continuous fluctuations in the 
balance of the Fund.  Over the past five years, it has been 
severely underfunded in great part due to the inability to 
forecast the future cost of large scale operations.  Past 
cost data and inflation estimates have proven to be 
ineffective when it comes to closing in on targeted 
contingency costs.  One example is the $462 million 
estimate for Vigilant Warrior, which funded activities in 
Southwest Asia, but only realized actual costs of $258 
million.  Unexpended funds from operations such as this 
were reprogrammed to support other contingencies that were 
underfunded.  A historical roller coaster of actual costs 
for past contingencies has set the precedent of 
appropriating less rather than more.   This change is 
evidenced by the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program which supported Bosnia.  It was initially given a 
cap of $192 million, but only five months into the program 
costs had reached $247 million and were expected to 
skyrocket to $500 million before the end of the contingency 
[Ref 6, p27].  More recently, this was evidenced by the 
original estimate to fund Kosovo operations at $5.46 
billion, which was later adjusted up to $11.24 billion [Ref 
2, p1].  It is suspected that the “low-balling” of 
estimates for global conflicts lies in the  political 
ramifications of revealing the true costs of sustaining 
contingencies.  Displeasing Congress with the prospect of 
long-term and costly conflicts could easily result in areas 
of interest not being funded for military support. 
This problem is further exacerbated by the decision to 
commence or participate in additional conflicts which are 
not included in the original estimates.  As reports of 
actual costs are revealed, monies are funneled into the 
Fund via supplemental appropriations for costs incurred to 
date.  It is evident that bills will continue to mount as 
long as operations persist.  Costs billed, but not recouped 
within the same fiscal year or refunded too late in the 
fiscal year to reprogram, are lost to the service.   The 
unfortunate result here is that the services will generally 
fund some part of the contingency out-of-pocket due to the 




C. INCREMENTAL COST IDENTIFICATION AND REIMBURSEMENT  
As with all new systems, there were some 
inefficiencies at first with the OCOTF.  Although the 
services had reported incremental costs for contingencies 
as required by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990 and the February 1995 version of the DOD Financial 
Management Regulation (DoDFMR), until recently, there 
existed no standardized methodology of compiling and 
documenting these data; or guidance on what costs should be 
considered as incremental.  The lack of a uniform method of 
capturing contingency costs was noted even before the 
inception of the OCOTF.  A 1995 GAO report described DOD 
financial systems as being:  
unreliable, high risk, not integrated; and the 
services being ill-equipped to reliably capture 
actual incremental costs [Ref 8, p14-15].   
The revised version of the “Contingency Operations” was 
published as part of the DoDFMR in February 2001, and is 
outlined in Volume 12, Chapter 23.  This guidance clarifies 
incremental costs to be limited to those  
above and beyond baseline training operations, 
and personnel costs  [Ref 4, p23-6].   
Therefore, only those costs that would not have been 
incurred during the normal course of completing scheduled 
mission requirements can be assessed as incremental to new 
operations.   
The categories for which services can now base 
incremental costing include personnel, personnel support, 
operating support and transportation.  Within these 
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categories, the services may identify related costs in any 
of the following major subsets: 
a. military and civilian pay, clothing and 
              equipment 
b. reserve activation and deactivation 
c. operational training, supplies and equipment 
d. facilities/base support 
e. reconstitution  
f. airlift, sealift and inland transportation 
Before this more clearly delineated guidance was 
imparted to the services, each was left to its own 
judgement in identifying and reporting costs considered to 
be above and beyond budget.  This lack of a benchmark by 
which to measure the methods used, resulted in a variety of 
systems being implemented across the Department of Defense.  
Differences were even found to exist within a service.  As 
will be highlighted later in the thesis, both the 
Commanders in Chief of the Atlantic (CINCLANTFLT) and 
Pacific Fleets (CINCPACFLT) employed starkly different 
techniques in order to determine incremental costs for the 
Noble Anvil campaign.  Both these methods also varied from 
the one used by the Air Force. 
All methodologies have been assessed in the past on 
their own merit and reimbursement from the Fund has been 
made regardless of the approach used by the service.  
However, it has become apparent that one standardized 
system is needed to provide the appropriate guidance, and 
ensure claims for reimbursement are based on the same basic 
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parameters across all services.  For the purposes of this 
research, only operational costs were investigated as they 
represented 66.4% of the costs incurred for contingencies 
in FY99; with 91% of all contingency costs for the period 
being borne by the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) 
appropriation [Ref 5, p9-10].  Operating support includes 
the costs to fly aircraft, steam ships, and operate ground 
vehicles and facilities for deployed forces.  Personnel 
costs which (represented 19.3% of all costs) are paid at a 
pre-determined rate based on troop strength, which is 
tracked by the United Nations.  In this case, no supporting 
documentation is required.  Verifying data must, however, 
be submitted for operational cost increases.  The remaining 
14.3% of costs billed were for transportation, which will 
not be specifically addressed herein although they are also 
part of the O&M appropriation. 
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The responsibility for compiling and presenting 
incremental cost estimates rests with the Service 
Secretaries and Heads of Defense Agencies, who are expected 
to report costs monthly to the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service (DFAS).  Current and past policy dictate 
that cost collection requirements will be disseminated to 
the unit level, where all necessary information is to be 
gathered and documented.  Instead of leaving agencies to 
their own devices, the newly implemented standard requires 
compilation of data by service-specific codes which will 
assist in linking costs that are captured to the service 
which incurred them.  A formalized accounting system will 
also aid in tracking contingency-related obligations and 
disbursements.  Finally, consolidated service and agency 
reports are submitted monthly by DFAS to the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), (USD(C)) [Ref 4, p23-
3].  
Reimbursement for U.S. forces contributed to support 
global contingencies is “automatic”, and is not the focus 
of this thesis.  The United Nations (UN) tracks troop 
strength, and computes applicable costs associated with 
personnel pay, clothing, equipment and weaponry based on an 
established rate.  Payments are forwarded to DFAS, which 
disseminates the appropriate amounts back to the services 
[Ref 4, p23-24].   
Billing is required for all other costs however, and 
must be accompanied by supporting documentation, as 
delineated by OSD.    
The following chapter will outline the different 
methodologies used by the services to identify and capture 
incremental costs under the guidance which existed during 











III. IDENTIFICATION OF INCREMENTAL COSTS  
A. DOD GUIDELINES 
The Secretary of Defense’s definition of contingency 
operations as reported to the President and Congress in his 
1995 annual report identifies contingency operations as  
military operations that go beyond the routine 
deployment or stationing of U.S. forces abroad 
but fall short of large-scale theater warfare 
[Ref 9, p2].   
This definition is the extent to which the 1995 version of 
DoDFMR described contingency operations and incremental 
costs.  It is vague at best.  The 2001 update seeks to 
clarify and standardize areas on what is reimburseable, and 
establishes a process for capturing data, as delineated in 
Chapter II. 
 
B. NAVY METHOD 
As stated in Chapter 1, Section C, CINCLANTFLT and 
CINCPACFLT employed very different techniques in order to 
identify incremental costs during the period of the Noble 
Anvil campaign.  The key to understanding the varied 
methods used lies in their interpretation of “routine 
operations”.   
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The Atlantic Fleet instituted a process which 
calculated the average hours flown for training for each 
month the squadron was deployed and where no contingency 
operations were required.  This average established a 
baseline and any hours exceeding it were considered to be  
incremental.  Once the number of incremental hours was 
determined, it was multiplied by a cost per hour figure 
based on type-model-series to ascertain the amount to be 
reimbursed for that particular type of plane.  The cost per 
hour was a factor based on historical cost data which are 
adjusted to current year costs by using an inflator or 
deflator rate generated by the Navy Comptroller’s Office 
[Ref 17].  The final cost per hour figure considers all 
factors relating to the use of the aircraft, including the 
cost of fuel, consumables and aviation depot level 
repairables (AVDLRs).  Positioning of the Naval assets 
prior to an engagement plays an important part in whether 
certain costs can be identified as incremental. 
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In March 1999, the Roosevelt carrier battle group was 
in the Mediterranean theater on regularly scheduled 
deployment upon commencement of the Noble Anvil campaign.  
This deployment had been budgeted as a part of normal 
operations, because the battle group did not have to be 
directed into the conflict area for the specific purpose of 
supporting the contingency.  Based on the definition of 
valid incremental costs, CINCLANTFLT could not claim costs 
for steaming to the Mediterranean Sea because the trip was 
pre-planned, and budgeted.  Likewise, AIRLANT could not 
receive additional benefit for its attached air wing which 
flew the sorties, due to the scheduled deployment of the 
aircraft.  Additionally, the aircraft carrier USS Theodore 
Roosevelt is nuclear powered, therefore no “steaming hours” 
are associated with it.  While some costs are associated 
with reactor core life of a nuclear ship, the vast majority 
of costs are associated with the additional fuel consumed 
by the accompanying support ships in the battle group.  
This billing was automatically accomplished. 
Based on the methodology used, we can see how the 
incremental costs were captured by CINCLANTFLT during Noble 
Anvil.  Note Tables 1-3 on pages 6-7, which reflect 
budgeted versus actual hours flown by type-model-series, 
for PACFLT and LANTFLT.  The Navy reported flying 11 
different types of aircraft for a total of 10,337 
incremental flying hours.  A different cost per hour for 
each aircraft was used in computing the incremental cost of 
each type-model-series, with the summation equaling the 
total incremental cost of $151.2M for active duty 
operational support costs, and an additional $4.77M for 
Naval Reserve assets [Ref 10].  In 1995, the CINCLANTFLT 
used budgeted rates which reflected average historical cost 
as the basis for computing incremental flying hours [Ref 9, 
p20].  In 1999, these rates were based on primary mission 
readiness (PMR), which considered flying hours per airframe 
used, per month.  Once the annual rate was computed, the 
budgeted OPTEMPO of 81% was considered as the baseline.  
All hours flown above the baseline were deemed incremental.  
Underexecution of the baseline resulted in a decrease to 
the number of hours claimed as incremental [Ref 18].   
CINCPACFLT’s approach (per the 1995 GAO report), was 
based on an actual cost method for computing incremental 
flying hours.  Decision makers felt the difference between 
actual and budgeted costs could provide the funding needed 
to offset unforeseen maintenance costs resulting from 
increased flight activity during contingencies [Ref 9, 
p29].  Based on this methodology, budgeted dollars would 
once again be applied toward costs resulting from 
contingency operations which fell under the  baseline.   
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In FY99, PACFLT used an incremental cost basis 
equal to 60% of the total hours flown in the 
contingency AOR.  The rationale behind this 
determination was that all the hours flown in 
support of the contingency were not quality 
training hours [Ref 18].   
This approach in effect was utilized to funnel additional 
monies from contingency reimbursements into the fleet’s 
flying hour program, which had been historically 
underfunded [Ref interview with Randall Scott].  
It had been speculated that the Navy flew 
approximately one third of the missions in the Noble Anvil 
campaign, but billed and received far less than that 
proportion in reimbursements from the OCOTF.  One of the 
factors that attributed to this imbalance is that costs are 
captured by the fleet, leaving pilots to account for 
contingency and training hours flown.  Squadrons routinely 
code and report contingency-related flying hours as 
training hours.  This is a significant concern with regard 
to the accurate identification of hours flown in support of 
contingency operations.   
The forward deployed carrier and supporting air wing 
status diminished the Navy’s ability to claim as much for 
incremental costs as would have been allowable had the 
assets been recalled specifically to engage the rebels in 
Kosovo.  Due to the prepositioning of the vessels, based on 
a scheduled and budgeted deployment, the Navy was not 
considered to have sustained a measureable increase in 
costs [Ref 7, p10].  
While the Navy’s basic incremental costs were 
minimized, there were also no bills submitted for increased 
  22
costs in the areas of base facilities or reconstitution.  
Several reasons were identified supporting the Navy’s 
position not to claim these costs.  First, the Navy EA6B 
Prowler squadrons were hosted by the Air Force, increasing 
Air Force costs.  Also, the Navy did not utilize any bases.  
Therefore, it did not suffer degradation of any facilities 
or infrastructure through its contingency support 
operations.  It also did not have the responsibility for 
establishing logistical and support channels for incoming 
troops and equipment, as did the Air Force.  Any costs 
incurred as a result of increased wear and tear to the 
carrier flight deck are considered to be part of shipboard 
reconstitution costs and could not be claimed under the 
guise of aircraft reimbursement.  Equipment and 
communications costs, if incurred, also would not be 
considered part of aircraft costs.  It should be noted, 
however, that reconstitution costs were claimed as 
appropriate for the use of Naval Reserve equipment.   
 
C. AIR FORCE METHOD 
A review of Air Force contingency data, outlined on 
pages 8-9, reflects the mission design series (MDS) of 21 
aircraft, flying 86,097 incremental hours during the Kosovo 
campaign. Hours identified as incremental were used in a 
matrix where cost per hour by type of aircraft (mission 
design series), within a program element code (PEC) was 
used to determine the dollar amount to be claimed as 
reimburseable.  Identifying hours by PEC meant that each 
Air Force base received a different cost measurement.  
These costs differed from those used by the Navy for 
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similar aircraft, and combined with the substantial number 
of sorties flown, enabled the service to claim greater 
costs.  The Air Force submitted a bill for $727.79M for 
active duty assets alone, used in support of Noble Anvil 
under the category of operating support [Ref 10].   
An interview with Ms Debbie O’Neil, AF/XOOT, revealed 
that the Air Force calculated its incremental flying hours 
during this time by using a budgeted flying hour cost which 
reflected historical costs.  This is a process similar to 
that used by CINCLANTFLT.  Preceding the adoption of the 
OCOTF, the Air Force routinely applied the minimum amount 
of budgeted home station training flight hours toward 
contingency support.  Any hours flown in excess of this 
minimum, in support of contingencies were considered to be 
incremental.  Budgeted hours were held close to breast in 
the event they were needed at the home station.  However, 
contingency requirements repeatedly called for the use of 
all aircraft in good repair, and qualified pilots to 
contribute to the campaign, which left no aircraft or 
pilots to complete home station missions during these 
times.  The result was a year-to-year underexecution of the 
budgeted Air Force flying hour program.  In spite of this 
continual inability to fulfill budgeted requirements and 
expend the associated funds, the service continued to bill 
and receive reimbursement for contingency hours flown, with 
the excess being applied to other O&M projects.   
These continual reimbursements provided the service 
with annual windfalls in their Operations and Maintenance 
accounts, which were used to pay for unfunded  projects, 
such as runway and roof repairs; depot maintenance 
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requirements; communications systems; heating and air 
conditioning ventilation projects; and quality-of-life 
projects, such as child development centers and barracks 
repairs [Ref 11, p15].  Despite widespread knowledge of the 
service regularly underexecuting budgeted dollars while 
requesting additional funding, then re-routing monies for 
purposes unintended, this process continued for years.  The 
Air Force continued this process of over-estimating until 
challenged in FY96.  The first of a series of General 
Accounting Office (GAO) reports cast a light on the Air 
Force system of identifying, documenting, and expending 
funds designated for contingency-related operations.  At 
this point inaccuracies were identified, and the Air Force 
was challenged on the aforementioned accounting methods. 
The 1996 GAO report indicated that reported 
incremental costs did not properly reflect offsets for  
funds which were appropriated, but not spent 
because of participation in the contingency 
operation [Ref 9, p17];  
nor were costs offset by scheduled training not completed 
due to participation in contingencies.  In this initial 
report, the Air Force was cited as not off-setting $1M 
budgeted for flight training exercises which were cancelled 
because of contingencies, and another $67M for free fuel 
received from foreign nations during the course of the 
conflict.  This caused estimates of actual incremental 
costs to be significantly overstated.  Not offsetting costs 
for free fuel was a lesser problem for the Navy which 
overstated its costs by $3M during the same timeframe.  The 
Air Force also submitted as part of its claim, costs for 
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reconstitution of equipment and infrastructure, and 
received $47.2 million.  An additional $126.7 million 
reimbursement at the discretion of SECDEF was seen as an 
inequity by the Navy [Ref 5, p16].   
Forty-six million dollars was also requested and 
received for redeployment costs.  This amount covered the 
cost of temporary duty pay, spare parts and flying hours 
for the redeployment of aircraft recalled from locations 
outside the theater of operations to support the campaign.  
The Navy submitted a bill for $15M which accounted for the 
redeployment of the EA6B, F/A-18 and P3 aircraft 
contributed from CINCPACFLT [Ref 13, p33]. 
This thesis attempted to make a comparison amongst 
like type-model-series aircraft platforms to determine what 
a comparable cost per flying hour should be for both the 
Navy and the Air Force.  However, it was determined that 
such a comparison would not be effective in ascertaining 
the disparities between the service costs.  This conclusion 
was supported by Naval FMB budget analyst, Ms. Karla Horn, 
who stated that although similar aircraft were used by both 
services, there are too many other dissimilar factors 
skewing the outcome.  These factors included such things as 
the number of aircraft flown within TMS by each service; 
the continual use of the same planes by the Air Force 
(which escalated maintenance and reconstitution costs) 
versus the changing out of planes by tasking several Navy 
squadrons (which kept Navy costs to a minimum) and 
capacity.  The resultant difference in flying costs would 
liken such a comparison to that of apples versus oranges.  
The system is too complex to make such a simple analysis.  
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This perspective is critical to understanding the fact that 
although variables may appear to be similar, there are 
notable differences between the two services which prevent 
an equitable comparison.    
 
D. IMPACT OF REVIEW AND VALIDATION CHANNELS 
The tracking of incremental costs begins at the 
squadron level.  Unit commanders are responsible for 
ensuring that flying hours are properly coded as training 
or contingency operations.  These data are forwarded to 
AIRPAC or AIRLANT via the respective air wings.  At this 
level, the Type Commanders screen the information to 
determine its accuracy based on the missions which were 
assigned to the squadrons.  The Type Commanders have the 
most influence on the costs billed because they are 
responsible for distributing flying hours to the units 
basis on their deployed or non-deployed status.  Therefore, 
they are the most significant validators of which costs 
will be considered incremental.  The other stops in the 
review chain include CINCLANTFLT or CINCPACFLT, FMB and 
finally OSD.  Changes at any of these other offices tend to 
be minimal and only occur if there are glaring 
inconsistencies.  The final stop before submission of 
reimbursement is at DFAS.  DFAS acts as a consolidation 
center for all the service submissions, and has no input on 
the information which is finally submitted as a claim for 
reimbursement. 
The following chapter compares the methodologies used 
by CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT and the Air Force to determine 
if the Navy employed a system which was conducive to 
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accurately identifying and reporting all incremental costs 












IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSES 
A. PAST NAVY AND AIR FORCE METHODS 
The absence of a requirement for a uniform system of 
identifying incremental costs gave the Navy and Air Force 
the freedom to adjust their systems to their unique needs 
and challenges.  The primary goal behind the methodologies 
devised by each entity was to maintain pilot training.  
Table 4 [Ref 17] highlights the percentage of hours 
dedicated to training, operational flying and overhead for 
typical Navy squadrons.  VFA squadrons comprise fighter 
aircraft while VS units consist of S3B aircraft which 
provide the Navy’s visual sign capability.  VAW units 
include the E2C aircraft which is part of the carrier early 
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warning system.  Finally, the HSL units comprise the Navy’s 
helicopters.  Budgets for flying hour programs are based on 
training hours needed by type of aircraft within a 
squadron, using the primary mission readiness formula. 
Although a matrix approach for determining flying 
hours was used by all the services, the internally designed 
methods of identifying incremental costs were applied in 
such a way that the benefit to individual flying programs 
would be maximized.   
Although it was later determined to be too difficult 
to ascertain actual costs due to the many methods of 
accountability in use, no fault could be found with 
CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT or the Air Force’s decision to 
employ the methods which they used.  However, assessments 
of these methods did reveal some deficiencies, beginning 
with the varied measures implemented by each service for 
determining incremental flying hours.  The Air Force method 
resulted in different (greater) billings and reimbursements 
for similar activities [Ref 7, p10].   
Another deficiency lay in the Navy’s record-keeping 
system, which was severely flawed.  Contingency hours were 
not properly documented at the unit level, which meant that 
contingency support could not be verified.  Lack of 
verification resulted in disapproval for reimbursement 
because the service could not document the validity of its 
request [Ref 17].  Poor records of accountability stifled 
the Navy’s ability to defend its position as accurate, when 
challenged by GAO on its method of data collection.  This 
highlighted the need for a sound system of capturing, and 
maintaining support documentation for incurred costs.  
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Having a viable system in place would have enabled the 
fleets to establish a baseline for normal costs incurred 
during regular deployments and therefore, easily identify 
costs above the baseline as incremental.   
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Another problem arising from the marginal record 
keeping system was reflected in the flight data collected.  
Reported flight hour records revealed that the Navy flew 
approximately 14% of the Kosovo missions.  Based on the 
percentage of funds reimbursed to the Air Force as compared 
to that of the Navy for missions flown in Kosovo, it 
appeared to some that the Navy was not receiving equitable 
reimbursement.  Although verifiable data disproved this 
premise, poor accountability for contingency hours could 
provide the reason for the Navy receiving less money than 
expected.  Therefore, if the Navy did in fact contribute 
greater resources, and improperly coded those hours, the 
most significant percentage of allowable costs were lost at 
this point.  No checks and balances of the mission codings 
could be identified as being in place to ensure the 
correctness of the documentation.  This clearly suggests 
that the flight data should be verified upon submission 
within squadron channels so it can be verified as correct.  
Contingency codes are outlined in the OPNAVINST 3710.7P, 
NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instruction, which 
pilots are trained to use.  Operational hours should be 
identified by Total Mission Requirements (TMR) Code 5O2 
(Contingency Operations – Higher Authority), whereas 
training hours are shown as Code 1A1.  Enforcement of the 
use of the instruction is critical to correcting the 
problem contributing to the most significant loss of funds 
for the Navy as it relates to contingency reimbursement.   
Squadrons are funded based primarily on training 
needs.  Normally, they receive their respective portion of 
the budget regardless of how missions flown are recorded.  
The problem that this situation poses however, is that the 
Navy will continue to lose out on cost reimbursement for 
hours flown in support of contingencies if the hours are 
not properly coded and reported.  Therefore, a direct 
correlation between the coding of flying hours and the gain 
or loss of funding should be made known to pilots, squadron 
commanders and fleet commanders in an effort to address the 
greater need of the Navy.   
 The final issue affecting the Navy’s ability to 
clearly identify incremental costs is its forward deployed 
status, because the costs of routine deployments are 
budgeted.  The Air Force, by contrast, must ramp up before 
responding to a contingency, thereby incurring significant 
unforeseen costs.   
GAO found the largest overstatement of costs for 
contingency flying hours in the years 1994-95, with an 
overage of $67M being claimed by the Air Force [Ref 9, p4].  
The Air Force’s method of calculating incremental flying 
hours, combined with the number of missions flown resulted 
in a higher cost assessment.  Costs were not offset by 
normal operation and training costs that would have been 
incurred under normal conditions. 
The Air Force’s reimbursement request for Noble Anvil 
included a claim for reconstitution for repairs to runways 
and degradation of equipment due to contingency 
participation.  Additionally, reimbursement included an 
additional $126.7 million into the O&M fund, approved by 
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SECDEF, which the service attributed to a favorable 
response to a surge in the depots.  Despite the noted 
justification for additional funding, the Air Force spent 
the excess monies on other O&M related repairs [Ref 5, 
p16].  Funding was further boosted by the receipt of $47.2 
million for reconstitution of infrastructure used in 
support of the Kosovo operations [Ref 7, p2]. 
While existing guidance did not expressly allow for 
the rejuvenation of home station infrastructure as an 
incremental cost; and despite the fact no other service 
claimed repair costs for bases or other support structures 
degraded by these operations, the Air Force was given 
favorable consideration.  DOD officials identified 
regulations only as “guides”, which were not to be 
considered all inclusive [Ref 7, p11].  During this time, 
it is unclear whether the Navy simply did not believe it 
was entitled to reconstitution reimbursement or could not 
provide supporting evidence of such claims.  However, no 
claim was made for this period.  A submission for $4M was 
submitted in this area for the year 2000 [Ref 13, p34], 
which by Air Force standards still appears very small.   
 
B. CURRENT METHODS USED  
In accordance with the revisions to the contingency 
operations chapter of the DoDFMR, the Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) 
disseminated a memo, in September 2000, clarifying guidance 
to the fleet on the approach to be implemented to have all 
units determine incremental costs in the same manner [Ref 
12].  As a result, both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet now 
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employ a method of capturing incremental costs which 
consists of only those hours flown above what is budgeted, 
minus any offsets such as the receipt of free fuel. 
Costs for increased training needed to respond 
effectively to wartime situations will also be captured.  
Under this new system, once budgeted training requirements 
are offset by actual flights conducted, the service will 
most likely realize an amount for which it is due 
reimbursement.  Despite newly implemented efforts within 
the Navy to improve its process, it is unclear just how 
proficient the fleet has become at accurately determining 
incremental costs to date.  The fleet noted increased costs 
per flying hour by TMS for FY2001 operations, but a GAO 
investigation revealed that the Navy’s claim for $121M 
reimbursement was reduced to $63M because it alleged the 
Navy was once again using contingency funding to offset its 
primary flying program [Ref 14, p6].  It was stated that 
the request included hours which would normally be used 
under regular training operations.  After being challenged, 
Navy leadership decided to increase its regular program 
through a supplemental funds request [Ref 14, p7].    
While GAO investigations have shown the Navy program 
to be flawed, the ramifications of these investigations for 
the Air Force were more severe.   Continual pressure and 
calls to validate their accountability processes reached 
the highest levels of the service, forcing it to adjust 
past practices.  Intense scrutiny caused the Secretary of 
the Air Force (SECAF) in FY2000 to issue instructions for a 
standardized process for determining budgeted flying hours 
for training Air Force-wide.  Once this was done, the 
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benchmark could measure any hours that were above and 
beyond budget.  The Air Force Audit Agency was instrumental 
in developing the matrix now used to determine training 
flight hours.  Requirements are based on the mission of the 
aircraft.  Flying hours are based on the number of pilots 
required per plane and the hours needed to become qualified 
in that model.  The result equals the number of budgeted 
training hours which will be submitted for funding.  The 
matrix provides a universal application which standardizes 
the flying hour program Air Force-wide. 
The second order issued by SECAF addressed 
accountability, and consisted of a two-part restriction: 
a. No additional monies can be requested for 
contingency support unless all funding from the President’s 
Budget has been utilized and it can be shown at the time of 
request where the money is to be used; and 
b. Flying hour funding will only be spent on flying 
missions or will be re-distributed to other major commands 
(MAJCOMS) which need additional hours. 
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This order is still in effect, with the intent to 
induce major commands to work together to resolve the 
problem of some units underexecuting their flying hours 
while others overexecute.  It will also prevent the 
diversion of funds to other O&M projects for which flying 
hour funds were not specifically budgeted.  The only 
exception to this new set of rules is reimbursement for 
hours flown in support of contingencies by the Air National 
Guard and Reserve.  By law, all funding for these two 
appropriations is to be spent on scheduled training.  All 
other costs are considered reimburseable [Ref 19]. 
 It should be noted that the budgeting practice now 
instituted, which calls for the inclusion of estimated 
costs for on-going contingencies, lessens the amount of 
funding which needs to be tracked as incremental by the 
services.  However, the impact of unforeseen contingencies, 
such as our current operations in Afghanistan will continue 
to present challenges for our senior military leaders with 
regard to accurate cost estimation. 
 
C. ASSESSMENT OF LOST FUNDING 
The overall assessment of this thesis, and the data 
compiled from individuals closely tied to contingency 
operations conclude that the Navy is generally operating 
from a regularly scheduled series of deployments.  The Navy 
is continually fulfilling contingency operation 
requirements in conjunction with regular missions, which 
are considered at the time of initial budget submission.   
Therefore, the majority of the costs sustained while in a 
forward deployed status are addressed at this time.  The 
only areas expected to increase substantially during 
contingencies are flying OPTEMPO and the use of fuel.  
However, the past years of underexecuting budgeted flying 
hour programs has resulted in a change for all services 
which requires the absorption of contingency costs to the 
point that budgeted costs are expended.  Only then can 
reimbursement for hours flown in excess of that amount be 
claimed for the contingency.  Therefore, no loss of funding 
to the Navy could be confirmed because OCOTF reimbursements 
were disbursed to the Navy despite the continuous 
underexecution of its budgeted program.  Based on the data 
  36
available, it was shown the Navy flew a documented 14% of 
the missions in support of the campaign and received 16.6% 
of the OCOTF reimbursements.   
Due to the segregation of costs by aircraft and ship, 
degradation of carrier flight decks due to increased flight 
OPTEMPO and other related shipboard maintenance issues are 
captured under shipboard reconstitution costs, not aircraft 
costs.  Also, aviation depot level repairables (AVDLRs), 
although variables included in the flying hour computation, 
are tracked and accounted for separately.  Therefore, they 
are also not considered to be part of the grouping of costs 
specifically based on aircraft platforms.   
Although the Navy would not incur many additional 
costs due to its response to conflicts in the theater of 
deployment, it does sustain wear and tear to the flight 
decks of carriers as a result of heightened flight OPTEMPO.  
Specific maintenance and repair costs incurred for aircraft 
launch and recovery equipment (ALRE) have been outlined in 
detail in previous thesis research [Ref 16, p19].  It is 
critical to understand that even though these costs are 
considered to be part of shipboard repair, both aircraft 
and shipboard costs must be accurately identified and 
reported in order to capture the total amount of costs 
absorbed by the Navy for contingencies.  Looking at the 
incremental costs incurred strictly from an aircraft 
perspective understates the true costs being incurred. 
Lastly, the additional reimbursements from the OCOTF 
to the Air Force cannot be considered lost funding to the 
Navy, as the reasons for this favorable consideration were 
based on issues specific to the Air Force’s request for 
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reconstitution cost reimbursement.  The Navy submitted no 
claims for reconstitution costs, and therefore, were not 
included in this final determination for additional funding 
by OSD. 
One additional area of consideration which could be 
regarded for potential reimbursement for contingency 
operations is the reduced life of the aircraft brought on 
by the expenditure of expected life hours due to the 
increase in conflicts and heightened OPTEMPO.  This is an 
area recommended for future research, along with the 
associated increase in operating costs later in the 
aircraft’s life cycle.  Research may prove that significant 
costs sustained for major repairs due to increased wear and 
tear can be directly tied to contingency operations [Ref 
17].   
Comparative analysis shows that the Navy requested 
reimbursement and received payment for the areas to which 
it was entitled, based on the data which could be 
independently verified.  
The final chapter will outline the conclusions drawn 
as a result of this research, and identify areas which may 




V. CONCLUSIONS  
A. VIABILITY OF PAST PROCESSES USED   
 With the lack of universal standards for identifying 
and capturing incremental costs, and the rulings on behalf 
of Air Force excesses, it is not appropriate to say that 
the Navy’s method of capturing costs was inaccurate, 
although it was obviously not as liberal as other 
methodologies used.  What is notable is how the systems 
that were implemented affected the financial position of 
the services through cost reimbursement from the OCOTF.  
The liberal interpretation by the Air Force of the vague 
guidance in place at the time of the 1999 Noble Anvil 
campaign, obviously benefitted the service.  The Navy’s 
stricter adherence to guidelines resulted in a smaller 
portion of the refunds distributed from the Fund based on 
its lower billings. 
 The barrage of GAO investigations into contingency 
costing from 1996-1999 not only identified the many 
deficiencies in the services’ ability to properly calculate 
incremental costs, but they also highlighted the lack of 
internal controls needed to verify the validity of costs 
being reported for reimbursement.  In view of this, it is 
difficult to determine the accuracy of the costs billed 
beyond what has been outlined in this narrative.  
Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the Navy 
grossly understated costs although it has been shown 
through numerous audits that the Air Force consistently 
overstated their costs in the area of flying hours as well 
as others. 
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B. VIABILITY OF CURRENT PROCESSES   
Lessons learned and an expanded definition of costs 
that are now considered to be incremental, have no doubt 
prompted the Navy to begin including these costs in its 
billings to the OCOTF.  Effective FY2001, the Navy began 
requesting reconstitution cost reimbursement for the first 
time, however, all the areas which contribute to the total 
cost structure have not been fully investigated, if at all.  
Also, new systems for capturing costs are being instituted 
which must be given time to develop before being assessed 
for full integration and compliance. 
 Although the Air Force was the major benefactor of 
OCOTF reimbursements in the past, it has suffered 
tremenduous scrutiny for its past practices.  Since FY2000, 
the service has focused on implementing significant 
changes, with the Secretary of the Air Force overseeing 
progress, and ensuring improvement.  Major Command CINCs, 
budget analysts, and unit commanders are all being held 
accountable for the full and proper execution of the 
budgeted flying hour program before addressing the 
possibility of billing for incremental flying hours.   
Standing orders from the Secretary of the Air Force are 
that there will be no requests for incremental funding 
unless the requesting command can fully validate how the 
money will be expended.  The service has also requested the 
assistance of their audit agency to aid in constructing a 
universal model to be used by all Air Force commands in the 
capturing and reporting of future incremental data [Refs 19 
and 20].   
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 In an effort to comply with Congressional and SECDEF 
requirements, and survive scrutiny, the decision to utilize 
one program for all flying operations is now the one of 
choice for both services.  Likewise, the offsetting of 
incremental flying hours by the absorption of contingency 
costs within the budget first is also the procedure adopted 
by both.  
 
C. DETERMINATION OF ACCURACY OF COST SUBMISSIONS FOR 
NOBLE ANVIL 
The capturing and validation of incremental costs 
rests with the respective fleet.  Due to the re-assignment 
and loss of civilian and military personnel who possessed 
first-hand knowledge of these activities, combined with the 
cited poor record-keeping practices of the Navy during this 
time, it is difficult to ascertain if the reported 
incremental costs for Noble Anvil were full and complete.  
Furthermore, the inability of service accounting systems to 
properly track and capture incremental costs cancels out an 
alternative method for the possibility of reviewing past 
data.  However, as compared to the areas considered for 
reimbursement by the Air Force, it is clear that 
reconstitution costs could have also been claimed as valid 
costs by the Navy.  Beyond this, there is no way to 
determine what other areas, if any, may have been 




The Navy Flying Hour Program is a complex and diverse 
system, which incorporates a number of major factors to 
compute the cost of a single hour.  The focus of this 
thesis was to develop a process which would enable the Navy 
to enhance its ability to identify incremental costs that 
are reimburseable from the OCOTF in the area of aircraft 
platforms.  In order for this process to be complete, all 
factors relating to incremental costs must be considered, 
and these additional areas are recommended for research at 
the end of the thesis.   
Specifically assessing areas which can be improved for 
aircraft platforms costs, we should begin with dialogue 
with fleet CINCs, wing commanders and pilots.  All entities 
impacting the process need to understand that before any 
major turnaround can be affected, contingency hours must be 
properly identified.  As the narrative indicates, it is 
suspected that the Navy may be losing contingency dollars 
but it is not clear how many hours are flown in support of 
conflicts.   
This research has shown that the Navy’s most 
significant problem is proper documentation.  Second, the 
documentation which is available, is scant.  Support for 
this thesis came primarily in the form of investigative 
documents compiled by outside agencies, which gave broad 
overviews of problem areas, and interviews with individuals 
who have corporate knowledge of various aspects of the 
flying hour programs of both services.  Detailed 
information was almost impossible to gather, confirming 
GAO’s assertion that the Navy did not have a viable system 
of documenting costs in place.  A complete and proper 
system of identifying and accounting for costs provides a 
historical trail when analysts and commanding officers turn 
over.  Such a system is integral to senior leaders being 
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able to clearly delineate what are valid costs.  Once costs 
can be identified as accurate, the Navy will be equipped to 
argue its case for reimbursement.  Without this information 
however, we will continue to lose this battle at the budget 
table. 
Realizing that funding estimates are based on 
historical costs and must be presented approximately two 
years prior to the fiscal year in which they will be 
applied, the estimates given should be considered as a 
base, with any cost overruns being identified as 
incremental.  Variations from the base need to be tracked 
in order to justify changes to the base during the 
execution phase, and validate the need for incremental 
reimbursement [Ref 21].  While both services have 
underexecuted their flying hour programs in the past, a 
sound system will be our best defense if we experience 
changes in the future. 
Another critical factor directly related to the proper 
identification of contingency hours is giving the fleet a 
reason to adjust their mindset.  As noted in Table 4, the 
flying hour program is funded based on training hours.  
Units receive funding regardless of how the missions are 
coded, therefore, no real incentive exists for commanders 
to focus on separating operational from training hours.    
Additionally, the Status of Resources and Training System 
(SORTS) requires that monthly reports must still be 
submitted once a unit has deployed.  The basis of the 
report is to reflect training accomplished, which forces 
units to code a greater number of hours flown as training 
in order to keep percentages high.  This is 
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counterproductive.  If there is an increase in the overall 
flying hours of our units in future years, we must have a 
system for capturing incremental versus training costs.  
There are a number of ways this system could be corrected. 
Recommendations include: 
1. Educating squadron personnel to properly document 
contingency hours.  Proper documentation would make the 
tracking of the type of hours flown manageable.  Dated 
flight hour submissions could easily be cross-checked to 
the designated dates of the conflict showing that a 
squadron did in fact participate in the contingency and for 
what period of time  [Ref 17].   
2. Considering that most hours flown while in a 
deployed status are operational, each theater could assess 
the average number of hours generally flown while deployed 
in a non-combat zone.  This would establish a baseline, 
with hours flown above it being recognized as incremental 
[Ref 17]. 
 
E. POTENTIAL AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Like the Air Force, the Navy could request the 
assistance of its own audit agency to ensure it is on track 
with recent changes to the Contingency Operations 
instruction.  A more in-depth look by the agency could 
reveal areas of significance not yet identified.  The 
agency could also be called on to verify the cost per hour 
by TMS approach currently in use, to determine its 
accuracy.   
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Additionally, a process for determining the increased 
wear on, and maintenance of, carrier flight decks and other 
areas of reconstitution should be investigated.  These 
areas correlate to Air Force facilities and infrastructure, 
such as runways and communications systems, which have been 
claimed for repair. 
 Specific analysis needs to be performed in order to 
assess what comprises additional wear and tear to aircraft 
flown more frequently during contingencies and how these 
costs can be recouped, similar to the Air Force’s method 
for determining incremental degradation of facilities and 
infrastructure during peak periods of conflict.  These 
reimbursements could offset the Navy’s expense for 
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